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Abstract
The legal community has long recognized that business corporations 
heavily favor Delaware as the state of incorporation. However, a recent 
study of merger agreements from 2002 by Eisenberg and Miller 
suggested that, despite Delaware’s prominence as the place of 
incorporation, companies “flee” from Delaware with respect to both 
choice of law and forum, and instead prefer New York. We set out to 
study data from 343 merger and acquisitions contracted on between 
January 1, 2011 and June 30, 2011 in an attempt to verify this 
conjecture.  Our study is important for two reasons. First, the 2011 data 
set shows that the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture is not supported in 
view of the new tools applied in our work. Specifically, we find that the 
state of incorporation has no effect on the choice of law for the state of 
New York, thus negating the earlier finding that Delaware corporations 
flee to New York law. The choice of forum being New York or some other 
forum is the major factor in our model, explaining about 50% of the 
variation in the choice of law for the state of New York. Thus, Eisenberg 
and Miller may have identified a transient phenomenon. Second, the 
article contributes to the debate about whether raw data alone can 
contribute to an understanding of a phenomenon such as the choice of 
law. We argue that, without further context such as a survey of the 
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lawyers drafting the merger agreements, the usefulness of purely 
quantitative data is limited. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Parties to mergers and acquisitions often include choice of law 
and choice of forum provisions in their agreements. Choice of law 
provisions determine which state’s law will govern in case of a 
contractual dispute.5 Choice of forum provisions6 determine which court 
will apply the law. Parties are reluctant to split choice of law and choice 
of forum, tending to prefer a court to apply its own state’s laws.7
Delaware dominates parties’ choice of law and choice of forum 
provisions.8 Delaware’s prominence has prompted several scholars to 
study the reasons for and effects of choice of law and choice of forum 
decisions.
Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller claimed a 
flight from Delaware to New York choice of law9 in merger agreements, 
5 Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 245 (1993).
6 Such clauses choosing forum “are now routinely enforced.” Geoffrey P. Miller 
& Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 
2078 (2009). “They can reduce dispute resolution costs, promote efficient 
contracting, and enhance functional specialization in the judiciary.” Joseph A.
Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection 
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL J. CORP. L. 333, 335 (2012) (covering 
the history of forum choice and its recognition by the Supreme Court but 
focusing more narrowly on instances in which the forum choice appears in the 
company charter). 
7 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: 
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1973 (2006).
8 Id. at 1982.
9 Parties are free to choose what law they want to govern their merger 
agreement. See Ribstein, supra note 5, at 247-48. In deciding whether to give 
effect to choice of law provisions in merger agreements, courts distinguish 
between corporate matters and peripheral ones. For corporate matters, even if 
the parties have chosen another state law, courts will apply the law of the state 
3
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suggesting that “once one accounts for Delaware as the place of 
incorporation, firms tend to flee Delaware as a choice of law and 
forum.”10 Eisenberg and Miller based their flight finding on a study of 
merger agreements in 2002.11 Law and economists subsequently cited the 
flight to support the notion that companies preferred the formalism of 
New York and thus, by implication, were consciously avoiding the law 
of Delaware.12 To test the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture, we compiled 
a later data set from the SEC EDGAR database13 using a six-month
period in 2011. 
Our criticisms of the original Eisenberg and Miller paper fall into 
two basic categories; one is data driven and the other is based on the 
limits of empirical research.  
First, our six months of 2011 merger data suggest that the 
conjectures of Eisenberg and Miller based on the 2002 merger data can 
no longer be supported in view of the new tools applied in our work. 
They conclude that “Delaware corporations tend to choose Delaware law 
less than other corporations choose the law of their state of 
incorporation”14 and that indicates a flight away from Delaware law. We 
used a two-factor contingency table to test whether the 2011 merger 
history supports the Eisenberg and Miller claims. Based on this analysis, 
there is no presumption that the percentage of acquiring companies 
incorporated in Delaware that choose Delaware law is less than the 
percentage of mergers in states other than Delaware choosing the same 
non-Delaware state’s law. 
Specifically, our two way tables reveal that for 2011 the actual 
percentage of Delaware corporations that choose Delaware law, 65%, is 
not significantly different from the percentage of incorporations in states 
other than Delaware that select the same state other than Delaware for 
their choice of law, 70%, (P-value 34%). Thus, the 2011 data shows that 
the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture based on the 2002 data can no longer 
be supported. Eisenberg and Miller reached a correct conclusion based 
on their data, but these results cannot be extrapolated into the future 
of incorporation to corporate matters under the “internal affairs doctrine.” Id. at 
266.
10 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7.
11 Id.
12 See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of 
Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1061-62 (2009).
13 These merger agreements are accessible to the public. See 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
14 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1973.
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because of the transient nature of the data. They may have, therefore, 
identified a transient phenomenon.15
Second, to gain a deeper understanding, we used multivariate 
logistic regression in the analysis of the 2011 merger data. Eisenberg and 
Miller also used these more advanced methods in their analysis of the 
2002 merger data, but they commented “statistical theory has made only 
modest progress in solving complex systems of equations involving 
categorical data.”16 We strongly disagree with this assertion.17 Both our 
bi-variate tables and those of Eisenberg and Miller have shown there are 
interdependencies between the variables associated with mergers: choice 
of law; choice of forum; locations of acquiring and acquired firms’ 
places of business; locations of attorneys of acquiring and acquired 
firms’ offices; state of incorporation; and whether the acquirer and 
acquired are public firms. These interdependencies make it more 
important to use multivariate methods to adjust the data for 
interdependencies in order to estimate the effects of each factor 
independent of the other factors. Without such adjustments, bi-variate 
tables may indicate associations that are due to factors common to both 
variates rather than to the variates themselves. Eisenberg and Miller did 
not think it was possible to “fully model[] all or even most of the 
dependencies that exist in the models reported.”18 They stated that 
logistic regression is not as powerful as their bi-variate analyses. 
However, we are confident that by using multivariate methods we have 
estimated the effects of each factor independent of the other. Thus, we 
have greater confidence in the regression’s ability to isolate each factor 
than Eisenberg and Miller did.19 They did not think their logistic 
regression analysis was as powerful as their bi-variate analysis.20
15 See infra Part IV. It is unlikely that our results will agree with Eisenberg and 
Miller because, as stated in the paper, choices of states in which to incorporate 
and choices of state’s law and forum for litigation is not a stable system with 
respect to time.
16 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1994.
17 DAVID HOSMER & STANLEY LEMSHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION,
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York (2000)).
18 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1994.
19 Eisenberg and Miller concluded “the simple descriptive story suggested by 
the bivariate tables throughout this article is reasonably consistent with the 
regression models we report.” Id. at 1994. However, their use of multivariate 
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Our main conclusion is that the choice of law and choice of 
forum are highly dependent. The choice of forum in Delaware explains 
almost 58% of the variation in the choice of law in Delaware. But, 
considering all the factors from Table 1,21 we found that if the acquirer 
incorporates in Delaware and chooses Delaware as the forum and the 
acquirer’s corporate office is not New York, the choice of law will be 
Delaware.
In contrast to the Eisenberg and Miller study, our data set reveals 
that the state of incorporation has no effect on the choice of law being 
New York. But if the company is incorporated in Delaware, it is most 
likely to choose Delaware as the choice of law to govern the merger 
agreement. Thus, the state of incorporation clearly has an effect on the 
choice of law for Delaware but not New York. This conclusion is 
contrary to the conclusion reached in the Eisenberg and Miller study that, 
if a company is incorporated in Delaware, the company has a tendency to 
choose New York law.
That non-effect of incorporation on the choice of law in New 
York seems to negate the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture connecting 
Delaware incorporation to a choice of law in New York. Our study 
revealed a different factor that accounts for a choice of law being New 
York. The highest probability that the choice of law is New York occurs 
when the choice of forum is New York, the acquired entity is private, 
and the attorney does business in New York.22 Ultimately, our analysis 
of the 2011 data set of mergers demonstrates that Eisenberg and Miller's 
logistic regression ignores the importance of eliminating variables in the 
analysis that are not statistically significant. See discussion of the principle of 
parsimony in Hosmer, et al, supra note 17, at 1. That may explain why 
Eisenberg and Miller were less confident in the ability of their logistic 
regression models to fully account for all of the factors. Id. at 1994. Without the 
removal of statistically insignificant variables, we cannot gain a full picture of 
the effects of each factor independent of the others. Because our study has 
eliminated factors that are not statistically significant, we are confident in the 
ability of our regression methods to isolate the effects of each factor independent 
of the other factors. Our regression method demonstrates: 1) what factors 
explain why mergers choose Delaware law; 2) the non-effect of the state of 
incorporation on the choice of law in New York, and; 3) the fact that a major 
factor explaining the choice of law in New York is the choice of forum. 
20 Eisenberg & Miller supra note 7, at 1994.
21 See infra Table 1. 
22 See infra Table 6.
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conclusion that companies flee Delaware can no longer be supported in 
view of the new tools applied in our work.
Our second criticism of the Eisenberg and Miller study is 
broader in nature and not directed at the data.23 We argue that it is 
difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from raw numbers without 
additional context or consideration of the reasons for a phenomenon such 
as the choice of law in merger agreements. For several reasons explored 
in this paper, we argue that without that additional information or 
context, the numbers alone may not be able to tell us very much. 
First, building a theory that companies are fleeing Delaware law 
based on the excess of incorporations over choice of law is 
problematic.24 It might be entirely unsurprising that there is a net outflow 
from Delaware, but it is be strange to jump immediately to the 
conclusion that there is an aversion to Delaware law. 
Second, an outflow from Delaware is possible in the first place 
because there is such a tremendous inflow into Delaware due to the 
perceived benefits of the legal system. Conversely, there can hardly help 
but be an inflow to New York given the dearth of New York 
incorporations. 
Third, it is unclear how much the raw numbers on choice of law 
and/or forum tell us about the desirability of either jurisdiction’s law. It 
is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions without knowing why or 
if there was a flight. To prove a flight, you need to demonstrate that the 
decision to leave a jurisdiction was knowing, volitional, and deliberate 
with respect to the content of the law of a jurisdiction. To reach 
meaningful conclusions about a choice, it would be important to 
interview lawyers regarding the thinking underlying the choice of law in 
a merger agreement. That data is now available for the same set of 
23 Empiricists build models of reality using these large data sets and regression. 
See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 819 (2002) (positing that statistical methods are integral to empirical 
studies).
24 Eisenberg and Miller built the idea of flight on the fact that the number of 
mergers incorporated in Delaware (189) exceeded the choice of law for 
Delaware (132). Similarly, “115 contracts that designated a forum had Delaware 
corporate acquirers” and stipulated a Delaware forum. Eisenberg & Miller, 
supra note 7, at 1982.
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merger agreements we studied to assess whether the Eisenberg and 
Miller conjectures of a flight to New York held true in 2011.25
One surprising result of using logistic regressions for choice of 
law in New York is that it reveals a Delaware state of incorporation has 
no effect on the choice of law for New York. Rather, the analysis 
revealed that the major factor, accounting for 50% of the variation, for 
the choice of law in New York is the choice of forum.26 The Choice of 
Forum Delaware explains 58% of the variation in the Choice of Law 
Delaware.27 Of the 188 DE incorporations, 113, or 60 percent, had 
choice of forum in Delaware. There were 55 incorporations in states and 
countries other than Delaware and of these 33, or 60 percent, had choice 
of forum in the same state or country. The frequency of a merger 
choosing the state for their forum to be the same as the state of 
incorporation is the same, whether the state is Delaware or another state 
or country. This article will suggest that forum may be such a significant 
factor in the choice of law because lawyers are reluctant to split the 
forum and the substantive law choice. Lawyers prefer to have one court 
decide the case and apply that forum’s law to the dispute.28 They are 
concerned that, if one forum decides the case but applies the substantive 
law of another jurisdiction, the forum court may misapply the law of the 
other jurisdiction.29
Part II will present the data for analysis. Part III will analyze the 
data using bi-variate and multivariate logistic regression and state our 
main conclusions drawn from the analysis. Part IV will explore the limits 
of using raw data for examining a phenomenon such as the parties’ 
choice of law without further contextual evidence about the choice made 
by the drafting parties. It will suggest avenues for further research. Part 
V summarizes our conclusions.
25 See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Context Matters-What Lawyers Say About Choice of 
Law Decisions in Merger Agreements, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 211, 218 
(2015).
26 See infra Part III(B)(iii) (parameter estimates).
27 See infra Part III(B)(ii) (parameter estimates).
28 See Kostritsky, supra note 25, at 224 n.46 (citing to lawyer interview in 
which lawyer indicated she never bifurcates forum and governing law).
29 Id. at 224.
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II. DATA FOR ANALYSIS 
Eisenberg and Miller reported on 412 merger acquisition 
contracts contained in SEC Form 8-K filings30 for a seven month period 
from January 2002 to July 2002.31 With the exception of seven mergers 
for which both Delaware and New York were listed as the choice of law, 
these data were a complete count of merger activities reported in the SEC 
EDGAR database. On an annual basis, there were about 700 mergers per 
year in 2002. 
In our current research, data from a total of 343 corporate 
mergers were gathered using SEC Form 8-K filings in the six month 
period from January 1, 2011 through June 30, 2011.32 Prorating this 
figure suggests there were about 690 mergers in 2011, which compares 
favorably to the number of mergers in 2002 studied by Eisenberg and 
Miller.33 The variables associated with these mergers are listed in Table 
1, including the frequency associated with each. It should be noted that 
these are all nominal variables for which the response was “yes” or “no” 
based on the SEC Form 8-K filings. 
Table 1 – Variables Available for Analysis
Variable Name n
Acquirer Incorporated in DE 188
Acquirer Incorporated in NY 2
Acquirer Incorporated in CA 4
Acquirer Incorporated in Other State than DE, NY, CA 147
Acquirer Corporate Headquarters in NY 29
Acquirer Corporate Headquarters in CA 67
Acquirer Corporate Headquarters in DE 1
Acquirer Corporate Headquarters in Other State than DE, 
NY, CA 246
30 “In addition to filing annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports 
on Form 10-Q, public companies must report certain material corporate events 
on a more current basis. Form 8-K is the “current report” companies must file 
with the SEC to announce major events that shareholders should know about.” 
These would include merger agreements. http://perma.cc/SQG9-2D8X.
31 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1985. 
32 See supra note 30.
33 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7.
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Acquirer Attorney Does Business in CA 61
Acquirer Attorney Does Business in NY 91
Acquirer Attorney Does Business in Other State than NY 
or CA 191
Acquired Incorporated in DE 11
Acquired Attorney Does Business in CA 58
Acquired Attorney Does Business in NY 69
Choice of Law NY 47
Choice of Law DE 162
Choice of Law CA 13
Choice of Forum NY 51
Choice of Forum DE 132
Choice of Forum CA 14
Acquirer Private 88
Acquired Private 188
Cain and Davidoff 34 studied 1,020 mergers for a five year period 
of time, 2004 through 2008, but chose to ignore acquisitions of private 
targets.35 With this more restrictive criterion for including mergers, their 
data only represent about 200 mergers per year during the 2004 to 2008 
period. But this was a period of robust economic activity as measured by 
GDP, which increased until leveling off in 2008 as shown in Figure 1. 
Thus, given that Cain and Davidoff studied a smaller subset of mergers
over a longer period of time, it is difficult to compare the results of Cain 
and Davidoff 36 with those of Eisenberg and Miller37 and our current 
2011 study.
34 Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. 
EMPIR. L. STUD. 92 (2012).
35 Id. at 94. 
36 Id.
37 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7.
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Figure 1
It should be pointed out that the mergers studied in 2002 and 
2011 were not a convenience or a random sample, but rather a complete 
count based on the SEC EDGAR database. Thus, one of the major 
objections raised by Cain and Davidoff38 to including mergers with 
acquired (target) private companies is moot because there can be no 
skewing due to the complete sampling based on the 2002 and 2011 data. 
Rather, the factor “Acquired Private,” which was included as a potential 
variable in analyses by Eisenberg and Miller39 as well as our study, was 
found to introduce a statistically significant bias in 2011 time periods for 
some of the responses analyzed. Finally, any comparison of results from 
2002 with 2011 must be viewed along with the potential impact of both 
political and economic factors, which neither the Eisenberg and Miller 
nor our present study can include. For example, the 2008 recession and 
sluggish recovery that lasted for at least six years and the passage of the 
Affordable Care Act are two interventions that could have profound 
impact on acquisition contracts. From Figure 1, the sluggish recovery of 
the US economy following the 2008 recession is indicated by change in 
the slope of the GDP curve: 0.72 from 2002 to 2007 and 0.55 from 2009 
to 2011.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1996. 
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III. DATA ANALYSES
Before reviewing the analyses of the 2011 merger data, consider 
the summary data in Table 1.40 First, among the 343 mergers, only two 
were acquirer incorporations in New York and four in California. Thus, 
any analyses of, or conclusions related to, acquirer state of incorporation 
must be restricted to Delaware versus all other states. Second, only one 
out of 343 acquirer corporate headquarters was located in Delaware. So 
the variable “Acquirer Corporate Headquarters” was restricted to New 
York, California, and states other than Delaware. With these caveats, the 
analyses of the nominal merger data consisted of two factor or two-way 
contingency table analyses and multivariate logistic regression models 
for specific responses. 
A. Contingency Table Analyses—State of Incorporation Versus State for 
Choice of Law
Eisenberg and Miller claim, “Delaware corporations tend to 
choose Delaware law less than other corporations choose the law of their 
states of incorporation.”41 With this hypothesis in mind, consider the
following contingency table that was formed using the 2011 merger data. 
Clearly, both New York and California had too few incidences of the 
acquirer’s choice of state in which to incorporate. Thus further analysis 
of this table in its present granular form is meaningless from a statistical 
point of view because 20% of the cells have expected values less than 5.
40 See infra Table 1.
41 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1973. 
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Table 1
Consolidating the New York and California states of 
incorporation categories with the “Other” state of incorporation category 
results in the contingency table shown in Table 2. The following 
likelihood ratio test reveals that the occupancy numbers shown in the 
first row of each cell in Table 2 are not statistically independent (P-value 
< 0.01%).
Tests
N DF -Log Like RSquare (U)
343 3 33.006002 0.1398
Test ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio 66.012 <.0001*
Count
Total %
Col %
Row %
Acquirer 
Inc. in DE
Acquirer Inc. 
in NY
Acquirer Inc. 
in CA
Acquirer Inc. in 
Other State
Choice of Law 
DE
122
35.57
64.89
75.31
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
40
11.66
26.85
24.69
162
47.23%
Choice of Law 
NY
25
7.29
13.30
59.52
1
0.29
50.00
2.38
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
16
4.66
10.74
38.10
42
12.24%
Choice of Law 
CA
4
1.17
2.13
33.33
1
0.29
50.00
8.33
3
0.87
75.00
25.00
4
1.17
2.68
33.33
12
3.50%
Choice of Law 
Other State
37
10.79
19.68
29.13
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
1
0.29
25.00
0.79
89
25.95
59.73
70.08
127
37.03%
188
54.81%
2
0.58%
4
1.17%
149
43.44%
343
13
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This Chi-Square test compares the percentages shown in the 
second line of each cell of the 4-by-2 table assuming independence. The 
fact that the Chi-Square statistic is large (P < 0.01%) is another way of 
saying that acquirer’s state of incorporation and choice of law are not
statistically independent. 
Table 2
Count
Total %
Col %
Row %
Acquirer 
Inc. in DE
Acquirer Inc. 
in Other State 
than DE
Choice of 
Law DE
122
35.57
64.89
75.31
40
11.66
25.81
24.69
162
47.23%
Choice of 
Law NY
25
7.29
13.30
59.52
17
4.96
10.97
40.48
42
12.24%
Choice of 
Law CA
4
1.17
2.13
33.33
8
2.33
5.16
66.67
12
3.50%
Choice of 
Law Other 
State
37
10.79
19.68
29.13
90
26.24
58.06
70.87
127
37.03%
188
54.81%
155
45.19%
343
But consider the results for Choice of Law NY in Table 2. In the 
first six months of 2011 there were 42 mergers in which the choice of
law was New York. Of these mergers, 25 or 59.52% were incorporated 
in Delaware and 17 or 40.48% were incorporated in states other than 
Delaware. Testing the alternative hypothesis “flight from Delaware” 
incorporation for choice of law New York versus the null hypothesis of 
“no flight from Delaware” incorporation for Choice of Law New York 
reveals there is insufficient information to reject this null hypothesis in 
14
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favor of the alternative (P-value 21.7%). This result is contrary to the 
claims by Eisenberg and Miller.42
Eisenberg and Miller further claim that—based on 2002 merger 
data—“Delaware corporations tend to choose Delaware law less than 
other corporations choose the law of their state of incorporation.”43 To 
test this hypothesis, consider the cases from Table 1 where the state of 
incorporation and the state for choice of law are the same. There were 
122 mergers incorporated in Delaware that chose Delaware law, but 66 
that did not choose Delaware law. There was one New York 
incorporation out of two that chose New York as the choice of law, but 
the other choice of law was a state other than Delaware. There were three 
out of four mergers incorporated in California that chose California as 
the choice of law, but the other merger did not choose Delaware as the
choice of law. Finally there were 89 mergers incorporated in other states 
that chose other states for the choice of law. We will assume that these 
choices of law were the same as the states of incorporation for this 
analysis. Then there were 40 mergers incorporated in other states that did 
not choose Delaware as the choice of law. These are summarized as a 
two-by-two contingency table in Table 3.
The following test statistics indicate that acquirer’s choice of 
state of incorporation is not independent of the state for choice of law, 
which the earlier more granular test revealed from the 4-by-2 table (P-
value < 0.01%).
Tests
N DF -Log Like RSquare (U)
321 1 19.313414 0.0887
Test ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio 38.627 <.0001*
Pearson 37.776 <.0001*
42 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7.
43 Id. at 1973. 
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Table 3
Count
Total %
Col %
Row %
State of Inc. 
Other than 
DE
State of Inc. 
DE
Choice of 
Law Other 
State
93
28.97
69.92
58.49
66
20.56
35.11
41.51
159
49.53%
Choice of 
Law DE
40
12.46
30.08
24.69
122
38.01
64.89
75.31
162
50.47%
133
41.43%
188
58.57%
321
In Table 3, 122 of the 188 mergers that incorporated in Delaware 
chose Delaware law while 93 of the 133 mergers that incorporated in 
states other than Delaware chose another state’s law than Delaware. Note 
that this does not mean in these 93 mergers that the other state of 
incorporation and the other state of law were the same state, except for 
these four: one from New York and three from California. But we are 
assuming the best case scenario for these 93 cases: namely that the state 
of incorporation and the choice of law are the same state other than 
Delaware. The Eisenberg and Miller conjecture based on their 2002 data 
can be tested from the data in Table 3. Here, the null hypothesis is that 
the percentage of incorporations and choice of law in Delaware and the 
percentage of incorporations and choice of law in states other than 
Delaware are the same. The alternative, according to Eisenberg and 
Miller, is that there is flight from Delaware law. There is not enough 
information in 2011 merger data to accept the alternative hypothesis 
posed by Eisenberg and Miller (P-value 34%). In the first six months of 
2011, the actual percentage of incorporations in Delaware that choose 
Delaware law, 65%, is not significantly different from the percentage of 
incorporations in other states than Delaware that select the same other 
state than Delaware for their choice of law, 70%, with the conservative 
assumption44 about the other states of incorporation and choice of law. 
44 The two-way table was for choice of law and state of incorporation. For both 
choice of law and state of incorporation, the two choices were Delaware and 
Other. The conservative assumption was that Other referred to the same state. 
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Thus, the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture based on 2002 merger history 
is not true based on 2011 merger history.  
B. Logistic Regression Analyses
While two factor contingency tables and their analyses above 
revealed that the conjectures of Eisenberg and Miller based on seven 
months of 2002 merger data can no longer be supported in view of the 
new tools applied in our work based on six months of 2011 merger data, 
what do these more recent data reveal about choices of law and forum 
relative to mergers in 2011 and Delaware as a state of incorporation? To 
address questions similar to these, Cain and Davidoff used more 
advanced and powerful analytical methods to analyze the merger data 
from 2004 to 2008, namely multivariate logistic regression.45 Thus, the 
remainder of our analyses will utilize this methodology to further 
understand merger trends based on mergers in the first half of 2011. 
i) Brief Introduction to Logistic Regression
All of the factors, Y, listed in Table 1 are nominal in the sense 
that the variables are either true or false. In logistic regression analysis, 
one of the variables in Table 1, a random variable Y, is defined as Y = 1, 
and Y = 0 if the response is true or false, respectively. Supposing the 
probability that Y = 1 is p, which is unknown, and the probability that Y =
0 is (1- p), we consider the following model:  
Y = f(x) + ɸ
(1)
For example, if Other state of choice was Ohio, the other state of incorporation 
was also Ohio. But in reality, the Other state of law might be Ohio and the Other 
state of incorporation might be Kentucky.
45 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34.
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Here, f(x) is an unknown function of a subset of variables other 
than Y listed in Table 1, while İ is a random variable with mean zero and 
VRPH XQNQRZQ EXW FRQVWDQW VWDQGDUG GHYLDWLRQ ı 7DNLQJ WKH
expectation of equation (1), we get, E(Y) = f(x). But from the definition 
of Y, we get expected value of Y, E(Y) = 1*p + 0*(1 – p) = p. Thus the 
unknown function, f(x), is the unknown probability of a true answer, p,
for response Y. Using the definition of variance, the variance of the left 
and right hand side of equation (1) is: Variance of Y = V(Y) = (1 – p)²p + 
(0 – p)²(1– p) = p(1– p), and 9< 9İ ıð Combining the two results 
indicates that the variance assumption of linear regression—that the 
variance is a constant—is violated, which means the data must be 
transformed to stabilize the variance. The following logistic 
transformation, which is the natural logarithm of the odds ratio, is one 
way to stabilize the variance of Y. This transformation is defined as 
follows.
 
 »¼
º
«
¬
ª

 »¼
º
«¬
ª

 
xf
xf
Y
YYT
1
ln
1
ln)(
(2)
The maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters in the 
model f(x) can be computed from the transformed variable T(Y) in 
equation (2) with the software program JMP8®. Using this software, the 
probability generated is the probability of “Not 0”, which is 1 – f(x).
With this brief introduction to logistic regression we will now 
address the questions posed above relative to choice of law, choice of 
forum, and state of incorporation using this more advanced and powerful 
statistical method to gain a deeper understanding of merger decisions. 
ii) Logistic Regression Model for Choice of Law Delaware
The following contingency table, Table 4, reveals that the choice 
of law and forum are highly dependent. In particular note the figures in 
the third row of each cell where Choice of Law and Forum are in the 
same state range from 66.7% to 94.5%. Though the Chi-Square value 
associated with Table 4 is a statistically significant value (Chi-Square 
445.1 has P-value < 0.01%) indicating that choice of law and forum are 
not independent, 20% of cells have an expected count of less than 5, 
which makes the Chi-Square value suspect.
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Tests
N DF -LogLike RSquare (U)
343 9 222.54820 0.5917
Test ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio 445.096 <.0001*
Table 4
Count
Total %
Col %
Row %
Choice of 
Law DE
Choice of 
Law NY
Choice of 
Law CA
Choice of 
Law Other 
States
Choice of 
Forum DE
130
37.90
80.25
98.48
1
0.29
2.38
0.76
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
1
0.29
0.79
0.76
132
38.48
Choice of 
Forum 
NY
5
1.46
3.09
11.11
37
10.79
88.10
82.22
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
3
0.87
2.36
6.67
45
13.12
Choice of 
Forum 
CA
3
0.87
1.85
21.43
0
0.00
0.00
0.00
8
2.33
66.67
57.14
3
0.87
2.36
21.43
14
4.08
Choice of 
Forum 
Other 
States
24
7.00
14.81
15.79
4
1.17
9.52
2.63
4
1.17
33.33
2.63
120
34.99
94.49
78.95
152
44.31
162
47.23
42
12.24
12
3.50
127
37.03
343
As an alternative to the two-way contingency table approach for 
analyzing nominal data, consider the following logistic regression model 
for Choice of Law Delaware that contains three factors from the list of 
variables in Table 1.
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Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Intercept -
1.633236
32
0.2186394 55.80 <.0001*
Choice of Forum New 
York?
-
0.649560
51
0.5467398 1.41 0.2348
Choice of Forum 
Delaware?
+5.84784
7
0.7417692 62.15 <.0001*
Choice of Forum 
California?
+0.33395
33
0.6870557 0.24 0.6269
The only factor, x, from Table 1 in this model that is statistically 
significant is the Choice of Forum Delaware. Deleting both the Choice of 
Forum California and New York, the following new model is generated. 
From the model below, it follows that the Choice of Forum Delaware 
and Choice of Law Delaware are correlated. 
RSquare (U) 0.5778
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 343
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Intercept -1.7216499 0.1919286 80.47 <.0001*
Choice of Forum 
Delaware?
+5.8960261 0.7379183 63.84 <.0001*
Are there other factors from Table 1 that might help explain why 
mergers choose Delaware law? From the last print out, the Choice of 
Forum Delaware explains almost 58% (100*RSquare (U)) of the 
variation in Choice of Law Delaware. We next considered other 
potentially important factors such as: the state of incorporation; the state 
where attorneys do business; whether the acquirer or acquired was a 
private entity; and what type of financial arrangements were used for the 
merger. Examining the response, Choice of Law Delaware, the use of 
logistic regression provides a multivariate analysis of all factors that 
could potentially impact this decision to choose Delaware law, not just 
the choice for state of forum. The resulting logistic regression model for 
Choice of Law Delaware is as follows.
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Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Intercept -
2.75801238
0.3766659 53.61 <.0001*
Choice of Forum 
Delaware?
+6.1931183 0.8084047 58.69 <.0001*
Acquirer Inc. in 
Delaware?
+1.9346607 0.44219 19.14 <.0001*
Acquirer Corp. Office in 
New York?
-
2.05072381
1.067887 3.69 0.0548
By transforming this model, Table 5 summarizes all combinations of 
probabilities,  xf , obtained for the Choice of Law Delaware logistic 
regression model. 
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Table 5
Probability 
that Choice 
of Law DE
Acquirer 
Inc. in 
DE?
Acquirer 
Corp. 
Office in 
NY?
Choice 
of 
Forum 
DE?
0.98 Yes Yes Yes
1.00 Yes No Yes
0.05 No Yes Yes
0.31 No No Yes
0.89 Yes Yes No
0.98 Yes No No
0.01 No Yes No
0.06 No No No
From Table 5, it follows that the odds of the choice of law being 
Delaware following a merger are highest when the acquirer incorporates 
in Delaware (an average of 96%). However, if the acquirer also chooses 
Delaware as the forum for litigation and the acquirer’s corporate office is 
not in the state of New York, the probabilities are very high that the 
choice of law will be Delaware (100%). Notice that if the acquirer does 
not incorporate in Delaware, the odds are less than about 30% that the 
choice of law will be Delaware independent of state of the acquirer’s 
corporate office or the choice of forum. Suppose we have two mergers in 
which the acquirers have the same corporate offices and chose the same 
forum. If one merger incorporates in Delaware and the other one does 
not, the odds are greater than 89 percent that the one that incorporated in 
Delaware will choose Delaware law. And the odds are less than 30 
percent that the one that did not incorporate in Delaware will choose 
Delaware law.
iii) Logistic Regression Model for Choice of Law New York
In a similar manner, a model can be developed using logistic 
regression for Choice of Law New York, which helps to examine the 
“flight to New York” issue in more detail. The following logistic 
regression model was developed as the model for Choice of Law New 
York. Only statistically significant factors, x, from Table 1 are included 
in this model.
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Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Intercept -
5.59266164
0.8357296 44.78 <.0001*
Choice of Forum New 
York?
+5.581297 0.6301622 78.45 <.0001*
Acquirer Attorney bus. 
NY?
+1.4247077 0.662829 4.62 0.0316*
Target Private? +1.6529041 0.696324 5.63 0.0176*
This logistic model reveals other factors impacting the choice of 
law for the state of New York. But as the two-way contingency Tables 2 
and 3 showed earlier, the model above indicates that the state of 
incorporation has no effect on the choice of law for the state of New 
York, which again negates the Eisenberg and Miller conjecture of “flight 
to New York”. 
Table 6 reveals the probabilities associated with various 
combinations of choice of law for New York, whether or not the attorney 
does business in the state of New York, and whether or not the acquired 
entity was private. The highest probability that the choice of law is the 
state of New York occurs when the choice of forum is New York, the 
attorney does business in the state of New York, and the acquired entity 
is private rather than public. The choice of forum being either New York 
or some other state is the major factor in this model as it alone explains 
about 50% of the variation in this response. Clearly there is a synergy 
between the three factors in this model rather than a simple linear 
relationship, which reveals the complex nature of negotiation related to 
the choice of law following mergers.
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Table 6
Probability 
that Choice 
of Law is 
NY
Choice 
of 
Forum 
NY
Acquirer 
Atty. 
Does Bus. 
in NY
Acquired 
Private
0.96 Yes Yes Yes
0.07 No Yes Yes
0.84 Yes No Yes
0.02 No No Yes
0.80 Yes Yes No
0.02 No Yes No
0.50 Yes No No
0.00 No No No
iv) Logistic Regression Model for Choice of Forum Delaware
It is anticipated based on the logistic regression model for 
Choice of Law Delaware and the lack of independence between the 
Choice of Law Delaware and Choice of Forum Delaware that one of the 
most important factors, x, from Table 1 for this model would be Choice 
of Law Delaware. Other factors that influence this decision are revealed 
by the following logistic regression model, where it should be noted that 
all the factors are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.
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Parameter Estimates
From this model it follows that:
1. If the acquirer’s corporate office is in California, the odds are 
less that the choice of forum will be Delaware as might be expected.
2. But if the acquirer’s attorney does business in California, the 
odds are higher that the choice of forum will be Delaware.
3. If the acquirer’s attorney does business in New York, the odds 
are still high that the choice of forum will be Delaware but not as high as 
when the acquirer’s attorney does business in California.
4. If the choice of law is New York, the odds are less that the 
choice of forum is Delaware again because choice of law and choice of 
forum are not independent.
5. If the choice of law is Delaware, all other variables held 
constant, the odds are highest that the choice of forum is Delaware as 
was initially postulated.
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Intercept -4.80972189 0.7741824 38.60 <.0001*
Acquirer 
Corp Office 
in California?
-1.83628645 0.6177585 8.84 0.0030*
Acquirer 
Attorney bus. 
California?
+2.3312862 0.7067349 10.88 0.0010*
Acquirer 
Attorney bus. 
NY?
+1.5092787 0.5284111 8.16 0.0043*
Choice of 
Law New 
York?
-2.03376738 1.0053467 4.09 0.0431*
Choice of 
Law 
Delaware?
+5.8374106 0.78073 55.90 <.0001*
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Table 7 lists the actual odds or probabilities associated with all 
combinations of these five factors, which reveals the synergy among 
these five factors. The first nine rows are for Choice of Law Delaware. 
The second nine rows are for Choice of Law New York. The last set of 
nine rows is for Choice of Law other than Delaware or New York.
Table 7
Probabilit
y that 
Choice of
Forum DE
Choic
e of 
Law 
DE?
Choic
e of 
Law 
NY?
Acquire
r Corp. 
Office 
NY?
Acquire
r Corp. 
Office 
CA?
Acquire
r Atty.  
Does 
Bus. In 
CA
Acquire
r Atty. 
Does 
Bus. In 
NY
0.99 Yes No Yes No No Yes
0.97 Yes No Yes No No No
1.00 Yes No Yes No Yes No
0.64 Yes No No Yes No Yes
0.83 Yes No No Yes Yes No
0.32 Yes No No Yes No No
0.97 Yes No No No Yes No
0.91 Yes No No No No Yes
0.73 Yes No No No No No
0.02 No Yes Yes No No Yes
0.01 No Yes Yes No No No
0.05 No Yes Yes No Yes No
0.00 No Yes No Yes No Yes
0.00 No Yes No Yes Yes No
0.00 No Yes No Yes No No
0.00 No Yes No No Yes No
0.00 No Yes No No No Yes
0.00 No Yes No No No No
0.26 No No Yes No No Yes
0.08 No No Yes No No No
0.50 No No Yes No Yes No
0.00 No No No Yes No Yes
0.01 No No No Yes Yes No
0.00 No No No Yes No No
0.07 No No No No Yes No
0.03 No No No No No Yes
0.01 No No No No No No
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v) Logistic Regression Model for Choice of Forum New York
Upon examining the factors listed in Table 1 as possible 
variables in a logistic regression model for Choice of Forum New York, 
only one factor was statistically significant, namely Choice of Law New 
York, which was expected based on the two-factor contingency table. 
But note that none of the other variables listed in Table 1 were 
statistically significant. And with this simplified model, 61% of the 
variation in Choice of Forum New York was explained as shown below 
(100*RSquare(U)).
RSquare (U) 0.6101
Observations 343
The logistic model for Choice of Forum New York is as follows.
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Intercept -3.46216439 0.3385046 104.61 <.0001*
Choice of Law New 
York?
+5.5903961 0.5817172 92.36 <.0001*
By transforming this logistic model to obtain  xf , the 
probability of the Choice of Forum New York given Choice of Law New 
York is 89 percent. 
vi) Logistic Regression Model for Acquirer Incorporates in 
Delaware
The logistic model shown below is for T(Y), where Y is 
“Acquirer Incorporates in Delaware.” From this model one can predict 
the probability that the acquirer incorporates in a state other than 
Delaware as well as the complement probability.  The terms shown in the 
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model are all statistically significant and represent only those from the 
list in Table 1 that are statistically significant with p-values less than 
0.05.
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Intercept -
1.16774078
0.2210379 27.91 <.0001*
Choice of Law Delaware? +1.9171687 0.2759369 48.27 <.0001*
Choice of Law New York? +1.1241658 0.3956299 8.07 0.0045*
Acquirer Corp. Office in 
New York?
+2.1683484 0.6616287 10.74 0.0010*
Acquirer Corp Office in 
California?
+1.1916121 0.334108 12.72 0.0004*
Stock? -1, Both? 0, Cash? 
1
+0.4334862 0.1549729 7.82 0.0052*
Acquirer Private? -
0.70675185
0.3122751 5.12 0.0236*
As the following statistic indicates, only 21% of the variation in 
this response is explained by the terms in this model, that is, by the terms 
listed in Table 1. Thus, other unknown factors contribute to whether or 
not the acquirer in a merger incorporates in Delaware.
RSquare (U) 0.2135
Observations 343
Table 8 shows the predicted probabilities of the acquirer 
incorporating in Delaware based on this model. The probabilities of the 
acquirer incorporating in Delaware for specific combinations of the 
significant factors in the model are all listed in this table. But a summary 
of some of these effects is as follows. 
First, if the choice of law is either Delaware or New York, the 
probability is higher that the acquirer will incorporate in Delaware than if 
the choice of law is some other state. Second, if the acquirer’s corporate 
office is in either New York or California, the probability is higher that 
the acquirer will incorporate in Delaware than if the corporate office is in 
some other state. Third, if the financial arrangements of the merger are 
all cash, the probability is higher that the acquirer incorporates in 
Delaware than if the terms are stock and cash, and if the terms are stock 
only, the probability is even less that the acquirer will incorporate in 
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Delaware. Finally, if the acquirer is private, the probability is less that 
the acquirer will incorporate in Delaware. 
Table 8
Probabilit
y that 
Acquirer 
Inc. in DE
Choic
e of 
Law 
DE?
Choic
e of 
Law 
NY?
Acquire
r Corp. 
Office 
NY?
Acquire
r Corp. 
Office 
CA?
Type 
Purchas
e
Acquire
r
Private?
0.82 Yes No No Yes Stock No
0.69 Yes No No Yes Stock Yes
0.87 Yes No No Yes
Stock 
and Cash No
0.77 Yes No No Yes
Stock 
and Cash Yes
0.91 Yes No No Yes Cash No
0.84 Yes No No Yes Cash Yes
0.58 Yes No No No Stock No
0.40 Yes No No No Stock Yes
0.68 Yes No No No
Stock 
and Cash No
0.51 Yes No No No
Stock 
and Cash Yes
0.77 Yes No No No Cash No
0.62 Yes No No No Cash Yes
0.92 Yes No Yes No Stock No
0.86 Yes No Yes No Stock Yes
0.95 Yes No Yes No
Stock 
and Cash No
0.90 Yes No Yes No
Stock 
and Cash Yes
0.97 Yes No Yes No Cash No
0.93 Yes No Yes No Cash Yes
0.67 No Yes No Yes Stock No
0.50 No Yes No Yes Stock Yes
0.76 No Yes No Yes
Stock 
and Cash No
0.61 No Yes No Yes
Stock 
and Cash Yes
0.83 No Yes No Yes Cash No
0.71 No Yes No Yes Cash Yes
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0.38 No Yes No No Stock No
0.23 No Yes No No Stock Yes
0.49 No Yes No No
Stock 
and Cash No
0.32 No Yes No No
Stock 
and Cash Yes
0.60 No Yes No No Cash No
0.42 No Yes No No Cash Yes
0.84 No Yes Yes No Stock No
0.73 No Yes Yes No Stock Yes
0.89 No Yes Yes No
Stock 
and Cash No
0.80 No Yes Yes No
Stock 
and Cash Yes
0.93 No Yes Yes No Cash No
0.86 No Yes Yes No Cash Yes
0.38 No Yes No No Stock No
0.40 No No No Yes Stock No
0.25 No No No Yes Stock Yes
0.51 No No No Yes
Stock 
and Cash No
0.34 No No No Yes
Stock 
and Cash Yes
0.61 No No No Yes Cash No
0.44 No No No Yes Cash Yes
0.09 No No No No Stock Yes
0.24 No No No No
Stock 
and Cash No
0.13 No No No No
Stock 
and Cash Yes
0.32 No No No No Cash No
0.19 No No No No Cash Yes
0.64 No No Yes No Stock No
0.47 No No Yes No Stock Yes
0.73 No No Yes No
Stock 
and Cash No
0.57 No No Yes No
Stock 
and Cash Yes
0.81 No No Yes No Cash No
0.67 No No Yes No Cash Yes
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOLARLY                    
RESEARCH WITH DATA 
This section raises broader questions about empirical research 
based on readily available historical data, rather than data from 
statistically designed and controlled experiments. These questions may 
be relevant to deciding how such research is conducted, and may shed 
light on the limits of drawing conclusions based solely on quantitative 
data in the absence of any theory or hypotheses to test. Are there 
questions that raw data cannot resolve and why would this be so? 
Empirical research raises questions about when its results can or should 
be used to draw normative implication and about what approach the law 
should take, given a certain empirical “reality.” Is there a structure that 
needs to exist before those normative implications can be drawn? Under 
what circumstances does data-driven empirical research suggest the need 
for further qualitative research without which we cannot make normative 
recommendations?
Analysis of merger data raises two fundamental questions. First, 
to avoid identification of a merely transient event, empiricists need to 
confront how much data they need to study before drawing conclusions. 
It may be difficult to identify a phenomenon such as a flight in the choice 
of law when that choice can quickly change. The second fundamental 
question addresses whether raw numbers by themselves can illuminate 
an issue based on a choice by parties, or whether empiricists need to 
gather qualitative data on why the choice was made and by whom in 
order to draw meaningful conclusions. 
Before critiquing empirical work, the benefits should be noted. 
Empirical research in a field such as law can illuminate how parties 
actually behave. In one of the early empirical studies in contract law, 
Professor Stewart Macaulay studied Wisconsin businessmen and 
lawyers. Through in depth interviews Macaulay found that businessmen 
were likely to ignore the legal niceties of contract law and to rely instead 
on informal mechanisms to resolve disputes.46 That study and its insights 
inspired an entire generation of scholars to study informal mechanisms 
46 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1963).
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between contracting parties.47 It prompted examinations of entire social 
networks that provided source of order without legal intervention. It 
caused legal scholars to study experimental data on the interaction 
between informal and formal mechanisms48 and the crowding out 
phenomenon49 and to reexamine the role of law in transactions. 
Empirical research can thus cause scholars to rethink entire fields of law, 
such as contract law, and to question previously unquestioned 
assumptions, such as the centrality of law in parties’ decision-making.50
Empirical research can be used to test legal theories of how 
parties would be likely to behave in response to legal rules. Macaulay 
looked at whether the law of contract influenced the way businessmen 
behaved in their transactions and how they dealt with disputes and wrote 
their contracts. In the corporate context, many scholars have studied the 
dominance of Delaware incorporations and proposed theories to explain 
the preference.51 In the context studied here, involving the choice of law 
in the merger context, scholars examined whether empirical data on the 
choice of law mirrored Delaware’s dominance in the chartering decision 
and sought to determine whether a flight to New York from Delaware 
choice of law existed and to identify the factors that accounted for the 
parties’ choice of law. They examined whether parties incorporated in 
Delaware reacted to Delaware law by fleeing from it and choosing 
another state’s law. They were looking at how the parties reacted to the 
law of a jurisdiction either by embracing it or by rejecting it. Empirical 
research, thus, often helps resolve important questions that would 
otherwise remain unanswered or subject to speculation: i.e., is there a 
47 DOUGLASS  NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(2004); See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); See also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 115 (1992).
48 See Avner Greif, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY 
LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 293 (2006) (studying informal dispute 
mechanisms of the Maghribi traders). 
49 Kraus & Scott, supra note 12, at 1058 (discussing crowding out). 
50 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985). 
51 See, e.g., William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974); See also, Daniel Fischel, The ‘Race to the 
Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s 
Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1987).
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flight to New York from Delaware as the choice of law in merger 
agreements? 
A. Determining How Much Data Is Necessary to Draw 
Conclusions
To determine how to resolve questions through data collection, 
an empirical researcher must confront how much data needs to be studied 
in order to gain an accurate picture of reality to illuminate an issue and to 
be able to predict future behavior or events. All three papers mentioned 
above, the Eisenberg and Miller study, the Cain and Davidoff study, and 
this study, sought to resolve whether there was a flight to New York 
from Delaware for the choice of law in merger agreements. 
The authors selected different time periods and used different 
data sets. To test their hypothesis of a flight, Professors Eisenberg and 
Miller studied a seven-month period in 2002. We studied a six-month 
period in 2011 (January 1, 2011-June 30, 2011). The Cain and Davidoff 
study broke up that span of time into three separate ones 52 to take 
account of some significant real world events. Interestingly enough, 
Eisenberg and Miller used their data to show a flight based on the fact 
that Delaware incorporated companies were less likely to select a 
Delaware choice of law than a New York incorporated company was to 
select New York for the choice of law.53 They based their concept of a 
flight on the idea that Delaware incorporated companies choosing not to 
select a Delaware choice of law were therefore presumably fleeing 
Delaware.54 Fewer companies selected Delaware law that were 
incorporated in Delaware. The reverse was true for New York 
incorporated companies; in that case, even though a very small number 
of companies were incorporated in New York, a disproportionately large 
52 See infra text accompanying notes 58-66.
53 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1989.
54 As Cain and Davidoff explain, the Eisenberg and Miller study “found that 
Delaware was chosen as the governing law 32.0 percent…of the time. The 
authors conclude that this represents a flight from Delaware since 40.8 percent 
of targets and 45.9 percent of acquirers were incorporated in Delaware.” Cain & 
Davidoff, supra note 4, at 95. A different theory of flight could have addressed 
whether a change in the frequency with which Delaware law was chosen over 
different time periods would have precipitated a different non-static data 
collection. 
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numbers of companies opted for a New York choice of law provision.55
Based on that discrepancy, Professors Eisenberg and Miller studied a 
series of factors such as attorney locale and the place of business for the 
acquiring and acquired companies, and then used regression analysis to 
determine if, after adjusting for these factors, there is a flight to New 
York away from Delaware. Ultimately, their “results confirm the flight 
from Delaware”56 to New York. 
We have already argued in Part I that there are difficulties with 
using the relative flight result based on showing fewer choices of law 
than incorporations for several reasons. First, the new data does not 
support the flight thesis in the later period we studied. In the first six 
months of 2011, the actual percentage of incorporations in Delaware that 
choose Delaware law, 65%, is not significantly different from the 
percentage of incorporations in states other than Delaware that select the 
same state other than Delaware for their choice of law, 70%, with the 
conservative assumption about the other states of incorporation and 
choice of law. The Eisenberg and Miller conjecture based on 2002 
merger history is not true based on 2011 merger history.  This highlights 
the danger that studying empirical data may identify only a transient 
phenomenon making it difficult to draw significant conclusions about 
future behavior without tracking data sets over time to determine whether 
the identified pattern holds true. Without that assurance, it is premature 
to reach normative conclusions founded on the potentially transient 
phenomena. Second, even if the data were accurate for a certain time 
period, the ability to draw meaningful conclusions may depend on other 
factors that are not captured by the data itself. For example, it may be 
hard to draw conclusions if actual data suggests that the lawyers drafting 
the agreements said that they would be happy with either Delaware or 
New York.57 The concern about the drafting lawyers being open to and 
relatively indifferent to New York and Delaware suggests that there are 
significant limits to drawing conclusions about choices without a
55 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at Table 3A 1989.  As Cain and 
Davidoff explain, “through double sortings of variable and logit models, the 
authors document a general trend toward non-Delaware law…in early 2002.” 
Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 99-100. 
56 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 1974.
57 See Kostritsky, supra note 25, at 229, reporting that 92% of lawyers involved 
in the same set of merger agreements studied in this paper are very comfortable 
or comfortable with Delaware law and 87% of such lawyers are very 
comfortable or comfortable with New York law. Thus, data suggests that 
lawyers are comfortable with the law of either jurisdiction.
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meaningful engagement with the underlying context and reasons behind 
those choices.
Assuming that the choice matters and the parties make deliberate 
choices based on perceived stark differences, scholars can solve the 
transient phenomenon by exploring the issue over an extended period of 
time. Professors Cain and Davidoff have explored the question of 
whether a flight to New York existed in a different way by comparing
the results in three data sets.  They studied a four-year period from 2004-
2008; however, instead of using one period, they looked at three different 
periods, two of which were tied to significant events, the Consolidated 
Edison v. Northeast Utilities case58 and the financial downturn. They 
therefore approached the empirical data differently to assess the same 
question: whether a flight to New York existed.  They found a weak 
trend to New York in the first period59 but a subsequent trend to 
Delaware after Consolidated Edison60 which then accelerated after the 
financial recession.61
What they found was that it was a complex picture and there was 
no unified flow. Instead, while early on they found a “negative flow 
away from Delaware,”62 later on the flow reversed so that by the 
financial crisis in 2008, there was a “strong flow toward Delaware.”63
After tying the increase in flow toward Delaware to 
Consolidated Edison and the 2008 financial crisis, both external events, 
Cain and Davidoff then developed explanations that made sense of both 
the choice of law and the other events. Using empirical data showing a 
variation in the flow, they developed a theory to help explain why the 
financial crisis would have precipitated a flow given “that legal actors 
are responsive to changes in both law and adjudicative certainty.”64 The 
greater expertise of Delaware judges was not enough to compel 
companies to choose Delaware all the time with the same frequency for 
all time periods, yet they did so at an increasing rate after the financial 
58 See Consol. Edison v. Ne. Utils., 426 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2005).
59 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 94. 
60 Id. at 95.
61 Id. at 94. 
62 Id. at 95. 
63 Id.
64 Id.
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recession and an adverse court decision. This led Professors Cain and 
Davidoff to conclude that “Delaware’s edge in the market for corporate 
law may be dependent on its ability to produce law that is attractive to 
merging corporations.”65 The picture of choice of law that emerges is a 
complex one in which Delaware is portrayed as having “competitive 
stature,”66 in the sense that variations in the law play a role in influencing 
the choice of law.67 This explanation seems consistent with lawyers who 
remark on the current salient differences between New York and 
Delaware law and demonstrate an interest in current law by commenting 
on the latest practitioner manuals documenting the differences.68
Professors Cain and Davidoff built a theory of a reverse flight or trend by 
comparing the frequency with which Delaware law was chosen over 
three different time periods. Thus, there is a change in the disparity of 
choice of law in a time series when the data are viewed as a time series. 
Our study uses a complete count69 based on the EDGAR SEC 
database data in one time period, January 1, 2011 to June 30, 2011.70 It 
uses the Eisenberg and Miller data as a benchmark for comparison.71 Our 
study confirms the Cain and Davidoff study and negates the conjecture 
of a trend toward New York choice of law and away from Delaware 
choice of law. 
These different studies raise three theoretical and conceptual 
questions for legal scholarship. First, how much reality do we need to 
observe in order to get an accurate picture that can provide a foundation 
for drawing both positive and normative conclusions about future 
behavior? Because lawyers can easily choose to change the choice of law 
65 Id. This insight is consistent with one that I gained in a study surveying M&A 
lawyers who seem sensitive to changes in the laws that affect merger 
agreements; see Kostritsky, supra note 25.
66 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 94. 
67 In a separate paper, Juliet Kostritsky surveyed lawyers and found that the 
choice of law is made primarily by lawyers, not clients. See supra note 25, at 
221-22.
68 Id.
69 We did not exclude any mergers because they lacked certain characteristics 
and so we have a complete count study.
70 In an earlier version of the paper we also compared the frequency with which 
Delaware law is specified and find an increase in the frequency with which 
agreements are specifying Delaware as the choice of law when compared to the 
earlier Eisenberg and Miller study. 
71 Our study does the same using the Eisenberg & Miller study as a baseline for 
comparison. 
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with every agreement drafted,72 studying a limited time period may limit 
the ability to detect changes in choice of law over time that respond to 
changes in the relevant law. The Cain and Davidoff study demonstrated 
that the choice of law appears sensitive to changes in the law and society, 
making it necessary to measure the choice of law at different points in 
time. 
Second, the construction of time periods against which to 
conduct a comparative study to take account of significant life events 
raises the question of whether an explanatory theory using data can be 
built using the disparity in the choice of law in a time series to comprise 
a trend associated with the triggering events, without doing further 
empirical research on the choices made by the lawyers actually drafting 
the agreements. A further study by Professors Cain and Davidoff or 
others could follow up to determine what effect the financial recession 
and the failed Consolidated Edison merger73actually played in the 
thinking of the lawyers making the choice of law decisions and whether 
other factors played a role as well. A separate study by Professor Juliet 
Kostritsky surveyed the 812 lawyers drafting the merger agreements in 
the 2011 data set and examined the reasoning underlying the choice of 
law. 
Third, the empirical evidence of Eisenberg and Miller finding a 
flight to New York law, and the later study of Cain and Davidoff finding 
a choice of law decision changing over time and responding to external 
events in society and the law,74 implicates the question of why we care 
about empirical evidence and how the evidence will enhance our 
understanding of how and why parties opt for a particular law to govern 
their merger agreement.75 The Eisenberg and Miller study identified 
72 Cain and Davidoff make the point that every agreement offers a new chance 
to choose a choice of law. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 93. 
73 2001 was the year of the failed merger but 2005 was the date of the first court 
decision. 
74 “Nonetheless while a firm’s state of incorporation carries significant weight, 
the choice of law in merger agreements can be affected by court decisions and 
statutes.” Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 97. 
75 See Edward Rubin, Empiricism’s Crucial Question and the Transformation of 
the Legal System, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART 
MACAULAY ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 77 (2013) (noting the “crucial 
insight” of Professor Macaulay and the empiricists that we need to find out 
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factors that might be associated with and influential on the choice of law 
and found, after using multiple regression methods that account for those 
factors, a flight to New York. Cain and Davidoff “document a new flight 
over time to Delaware.”76 These studies all shed light on what factors are 
associated with the parties’ choice of law, help to pinpoint the time 
period associated with a shift in the choice of law, and help to resolve 
whether there is a flight to Delaware away from New York. Perhaps we 
can surmise that the choice of law provisions is working to enhance party 
choice, and the very existence of changes in the choice of law indicates 
that parties are taking advantage of that freedom. If party choice is a 
primary goal of the legal system, then the data seem to confirm the 
achievement of one goal in allowing parties to choose the law to govern 
their agreements. 
B. Studying a Flight from Delaware: A Complex Subject for 
Analysis
Empirical studies may need to collect data over time in order to 
gain an accurate picture designed to study the flight from Delaware law.  
But in focusing on a subject for empirical data collection and then 
building a theory that Delaware companies are fleeing Delaware and 
thereby Delaware law, the identification of a subject that is appropriate 
for empirical research is critical. Such studies also raise interesting issues 
that may conceal underlying problems, which might make the data 
collected difficult to interpret or even misleading. For example, studying 
a supposed flight may be problematic for a number of reasons that are 
not discussed in prior studies of the issue.
First, it might be entirely unsurprising that there is a net outflow 
from Delaware but it would be strange to necessarily jump to the 
conclusion that there is an aversion to Delaware law, which a flight 
thesis implies. There might be all kinds of non-law reasons to choose 
some other jurisdiction for any particular agreement like a merger 
agreement. The Eisenberg and Miller study seems to assume that there 
are substantive legal reasons underlying the flight to New York for the 
choice of law; otherwise, why describe it as a flight?  If no aversion to 
whether the laws we have devised are “produc[ing] some effect in the real 
world.”).
76 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 34, at 95. “Ultimately we found a weak trend 
toward Delaware and away from New York after the Consolidated Edison
decision and a strong flow toward Delaware in the financial crisis.” Id.
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Delaware law exists, then there is no reason to describe the choice of 
New York law as a flight from Delaware. 
Second, there can be an outflow from Delaware in the first place 
because there is such a tremendous inflow into Delaware and because of
the perceived benefits of their legal system. Conversely, there can hardly 
help but be an inflow to New York given the dearth of New York 
incorporations. To claim a departure from a baseline that is enormously 
skewed towards Delaware law constitutes a flight from Delaware law 
seems misguided. As one colleague commented, it has a “Nobody goes 
there anymore, it’s too crowded” connotation.77
Third, it is unclear whether the raw numbers on choice of law 
and forum tell us anything about the desirability of either jurisdiction’s 
law. It is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions without knowing 
why there was a flight. To prove a flight, you would need to demonstrate 
that the decision to leave a jurisdiction was knowing, volitional, and 
deliberate with respect to the content of the law of a jurisdiction. To 
reach meaningful conclusions about a choice, it would be important to 
interview the lawyers who think of underlying the choice of law in a 
merger agreement. That data is now available.78
C. Determining Whether Raw Numbers Can Illuminate Party 
Choice
Before attaching significance to data and before finding a flight, 
one must first show that there has been a volitional movement, i.e., not a 
change in pattern of law selection that is coincidental or happenstance,
but an intentional decision (any intent, but more than mere chance) to 
favor one state over the other. One must also rule out decisions that are 
made with a gun to one’s head or choices that are under the influence of 
a random selection machine. So, one or two sets of numbers by 
themselves do not prove a flight. To prove a flight, you need to find one 
or more reasons that caused the flight, and that they were made 
intentionally. 
One intentional form of decision is called habit or custom. That 
is, one might choose a state law because it is customary to do so, or 
because one has made a habit of doing so. Habits and customs grow up 
77 Charles Korsmo interview.
78 See Kostritsky, supra note 25.
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over time, but start as volitional decisions. Someone decided to 
incorporate new companies in Delaware, and over time the decision 
where to incorporate became a habit. So now many lawyers incorporate
everything in Delaware without thinking about it. There may have been 
good reasons to do so ab initio, but habit and herd instinct are now the 
drivers, not careful thought.
In the 2002 study when the predominant choice of incorporation
was Delaware followed by New York, Professors Eisenberg and Miller 
found a flight based on these numbers: 181 incorporations were in 
Delaware while there were only 135 choice of law clauses selecting
Delaware. There is a “flight” in the sense that Delaware corporations 
picked Delaware law to govern in only 135/181 corporations. The 
reverse was true for New York—in which 5 companies were
incorporated in New York, and 63 corporations selected New York law. 
In the first six months of 2011, there were 42 mergers in which the 
choice of law was New York. Of these mergers, 25 or 59.52% were 
incorporated in Delaware and 17 or 40.48% were incorporated in states 
other than Delaware. Testing the alternative hypothesis “flight from 
Delaware” incorporation for choice of law New York versus the null 
hypothesis of “no flight from Delaware” incorporation for choice of law 
New York reveals there is insufficient information to reject this null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative (P-value 21.7%). This result is 
contrary to the claims by Eisenberg and Miller.79
To draw conclusions on the significance and meaning of a choice 
of law, in empirical research such as ours, or other prior studies, we need 
to examine the choice of law decisions closely to determine that the 
choice of law decision to determine that that the choice of law was 
volitional and not mere happenstance. Since the choice of law can be 
chosen each time with each new merger agreement, there is reason to 
believe that it was more than mere chance that resulted in the choice of 
law. Moreover, our regression analysis of the data clearly demonstrated 
the strong dependence among different factors affecting the choice of 
law.
But even if the choice is not happenstance, and is not a 
coincidence, there are reasons to question how much volition and intent 
one can attach to the choice of law data for several reasons and those 
limitations may narrow the implications one can draw from the data on 
“choice.” If the choice is the result of habit or perhaps an unreflective 
copying of a prior language in a prior agreement by a lawyer, then it may 
79 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7.
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be hard to argue that there is anything more at work than a bystander 
herd effect. Without more and without different forms of evidence, we 
cannot know what really drove the decision making it harder to draw 
meaningful conclusions from the choice.
Moreover, when a court looks at a party’s choice, and talks about 
their intent or agreement to something such as a choice of law, the court 
subsumes into what it calls “the party's intent” all of the conscious and 
unconscious decisions that were actually made by party's agents and 
advisors, without those persons necessarily—and in fact usually not—
informing the principal. Decisions made by the agent/advisor without the 
knowledge or understanding of the decision or its implications are thus 
imputed to the party. 
In addition, a corporate lawyer may be ignorant of many state’s 
laws, and thus, even if the merger agreement selects a particular state law 
to govern, it may not reflect a deliberative choice. Choice of law is an 
area where this would be almost universally so, since few laymen—and 
not all that many lawyers—have any concept of the real differences 
between state laws. Choice of law is a material element of very few law 
school courses. This ignorance is then compounded by bar exams, which 
primarily test on model codes and universal concepts rather than specific 
state laws. Many junior lawyers will have never considered choice of law 
issues when they go to draft an agreement, and many will copy (and 
potentially misuse) the precedents on which they rely.
Another issue complicating the choice of law issue is that the 
lawyer is acting on behalf of the client/commercial firm who is the 
principal. These issues of choice arising in the context of principal and 
agent raise the difficult issue of determining the extent to which the 
choice80 reflects the principal’s choice at all, making it difficult to 
attribute meaning to the object of the principal’s choice. At the same 
time, there is a cost/benefit issue here that makes this choice of law 
decision a non-issue in the vast majority of cases. Very few contracts are 
ultimately the subject of any dispute, and it is even rarer for the choice of 
law to be significant in a dispute.  Applied to contracts generally, choice 
of law has a very slight impact. There are exceptions, such as the case of 
non-compete covenants, where the provisions may be void in one state 
80 See Robert C. Clark, AGENCY COSTS VERSUS FIDUCIARY DUTIES, IN 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (John W. Pratt & 
Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., 1990).
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and enforceable in another; another is in the case of security documents 
in real estate transactions involving a state like California, with its one 
action rule that would absolutely frustrate lenders who don't know about 
it. Lawyers who work in those fields would generally be expected to 
know about that problem. But where the risk of litigation is slight, the 
time spent worrying about choice of law is minimized for efficiency 
sake. After all, someone has to pay for the legal analysis, and few clients 
will pay for a thorough review of “boilerplate” terms, absent some 
significant reason to do so. There will be precious few times when a 
client will be able to say that “oh yes, I would have killed the deal had I 
known the potential impact of the difference in state law.” 
For example, if one looks at the 2002 study, because only 135 
corporations chose Delaware law out of 181 Delaware corporations, we 
might have to figure out what was going on with the 46 who opted out of 
Delaware law, perhaps to New York law, before we could draw 
meaningful conclusions. If many of those 46 did not consider the choice 
at all, or did not care because it was not one of the main business points, 
or the lawyer chose and did not inform the principal, then even if the 
party did not “choose” Delaware, we cannot assume they knowingly 
opted out of Delaware. Further, for any of the 46 who chose not to have 
Delaware law govern a Delaware chartered corporation in a merger 
agreement, and who considered the choice, there might be many reasons 
contributing to the decision. Before one could draw meaningful 
conclusions from a flight to New York or to Delaware, we would need to 
analyze those reasons. 
Moreover, since there are budget constraints on parties, if the 46 
who opted out of Delaware thought that the choice of law was 
unimportant, there may be no significance to the opt out. Why call it a 
flight at all? Moreover, if the lawyer thought that choice of law needed to 
be in every agreement, but that it did not matter much what law was 
specified,81 then it would be hard to argue that there was a flight in a 
meaningful sense or that the parties had an aversion to Delaware law. 
Thus, even if there were a greater frequency with “Delaware 
corporations tend to choose Delaware law less than other corporations 
choose the law of their state of incorporation” (a result we did not find 
validated in our 2011 study), it may be hard to draw conclusions if actual 
data suggests that the lawyers drafting the agreements said that they 
would be happy with either Delaware or New York. If the drafting 
lawyers were open to and relatively indifferent to New York and 
81 See Kostritsky, supra note 25.
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Delaware, there would be significant limits on drawing conclusions on 
choices without a better understanding of the underlying context and 
reasons underlying the choice.
Finally, these empirical studies not only raise possible caveats on 
when we can establish a knowing and deliberate flight, and what 
conclusions to draw from a flight, they also seem implicitly to reject the 
idea that there can be one “overarching” explanation for a choice of law, 
such as the superior expertise of the Delaware judiciary or a unitary 
preference for formalism,82 unless further empirical studies are 
conducted to compare the influence of that factor with other 
determinants. It is possible to imagine that an empirical study could be 
conducted that isolated formalism as one of the factors contributing to a 
choice of law decision, and compared its effect on the choice of law with 
other factors that actually influenced the decision and the lawyer making 
the choice. The complexity of the influences on choice of law suggests 
that it could be difficult to find that a choice of law, made at a particular 
point in time, can be explained by a unitary theory, such as a preference 
for formalism. Caution in explaining the choice of law or any other 
variable seems to be the most important lesson from these empirical 
studies. However, that caution should not deter further studies on 
formalism as an influence on the choice of law decision by lawyers and 
clients; it may be an important subject for further study, but such further 
studies should be careful to consider qualitative research to provide 
context. 
Our own empirical study on the flight issue convinced us that 
before we could draw implications from studying a flight pattern, we 
needed more information from those actually making the choice of law 
decisions.83 Thus, it may be that in seeking to confirm or disaffirm initial 
conclusions on the factors influencing the choice of law, work should 
first be conducted to ascertain the influence of all those factors on the
lawyer or on lawyers and clients. 
82 The new formalists relied on the initial findings of a flight to New York to 
conclude that parties prefer New York because of its formal nature and that 
courts should follow their lead. See Kraus & Scott, supra note 12, at 1061-62.
83 See Kostritsky, supra note 25.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this study, we observed and confirmed the strong correlation 
between the choice of law and the factors suggested by Professor Miller 
and Eisenberg: business locale, attorney locale, and state of 
incorporation. Without dispute, Delaware’s dominance as the state of 
incorporation heavily influences subsequent decisions when it comes to 
the choice of law to govern corporate mergers. As elucidated in Table 3, 
Delaware law governed more than fifty percent of merger contracts.84
This is unsurprising, since Delaware was the state of incorporation for 
more than half of the acquirers we studied.85 However, the significance 
of this study is to examine the outflow from Delaware as suggested by 
Professors Eisenberg and Miller.  To that end, while we are able to 
conclude that New York is indeed the second most frequently selected 
state behind Delaware (by comparing data gathered in 2002 and 2011),
we find that the actual percentage of incorporations in Delaware that 
choose Delaware law is not significantly different from the percentage of 
corporations in states other than Delaware that select the same state other 
than Delaware for their choice of law. This negates the Eisenberg and 
Miller conjecture of a flight from Delaware. We nonetheless confirmed 
that, for New York, choice of forum influences corporate decisions in the 
choice of law for New York. 
Our results, along with Professor Miller and Eisenberg’s results, 
generate one crucial question for further research.  While scholars 
continue to debate how each factor influences the choice of law, the 
essential question that is closest to the interest of the bar remains simple: 
what influences practitioners to choose a certain state law over another to 
govern merger deals?  Without further empirical evidence on the 
potential drivers behind the choice from direct evidence, we may not be 
able to identify the statistically significant drivers behind those choices.
Statistical analysis provided insight into how a variety of factors 
correlated with the choice of law and choice of forum—how merger 
attorneys perceive these factors, whether and how these factors indeed 
influence practitioners when deciding the choice of law, or whether other 
rationales drive the ultimate choice of law decision. Information that is 
now available in a forthcoming study can help further interpret the 
meaning of the data and the choices.  
84 See supra Table 3.
85 178 of 334 acquirers were incorporated in Delaware, which accounted for 
53.29%.  
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The prior empirical studies of the flight issue raise important 
questions about the methodology of empirical research and the 
restrictions imposed when drawing normative implications on choice of 
law from a limited data set without further data collection from the 
lawyers making the choices. 
Finally, the data did not bear out the Eisenberg and Miller
hypothesis, and data alone cannot provide useful insight into whether 
there is a flight from Delaware and, if there is one, why it is occurring. 
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